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TRADEMARKS AND THE BOUNDARIES OF THE FIRMt
DAN L. BURK* & BRETT H. MCDONNELL"
ABSTRACT
Coase's theory of the firm has become a familiar tool to analyze the
structure and organization of businesses. Such analyses have
increasingly focused on property-based theories of the firm, including
intellectual property. In previous work we have discussed the
application of this model to patents, copyrights, and trade secrets.
Here we take up the theory of the firm with regard to trademarks,
which act as signals of firm reputation, and so have application and
effects that differ substantially from other forms of intellectual
property. Using the framework from our previous analyses, we
examine the propensity of trademarks to lower transaction costs
between firms, as well as within firms, suggesting that such
doctrines will have significant effects on the size and structure of the
firm.
t Copyright 2007-08 by Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell. We are grateful to Laura
Heymann, Mike Madison, Martin Peitz, participants in the OECD Workshop on Trademarks
and Trademark Data, and participants in the 2008 Intellectual Property Scholar's
Conference for their comments on earlier versions of this Article.
* Chancellor's Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine.
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INTRODUCTION
Modern commerce functions in a sea of trademarks. Consumers
depend upon such marks to identify goods and services and
increasingly adopt the marks to communicate loyalty or allegiance
to preferred brands of goods.' Consequently, firms spend billions of
dollars each year in developing, establishing, promoting, and
maintaining their trademarks in the marketplace.2 A recognized
trademark is frequently the most valuable asset held by the modern
firm.3
In this paper we consider certain aspects of this latter dimension
of trademarks: their value as assets and their place in the firm.
Although trademark law traditionally contemplates the welfare and
perceptions of consumers,4 we will be largely unconcerned about the
benefits or effects of trademark law on consumers, except as an
indirect factor in our primary analysis. Instead, we will focus on the
manner in which the legal existence of such assets, and by which
the legal regime for control of such assets, may affect the size and
structure of economic firms. We will argue that the law allocating
the use of trademarks has an important effect, and sometimes a
profound effect, on the contours and organization of firms.
In previous work we have considered how other forms of intellec-
tual property, particularly patents, copyrights, and trade secrets,
might influence the size and structure of firms, and ultimately of
entire industrial sectors.5 Our earlier analysis assessed these types
1. Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual
Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615,630-31 (1981); Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer
Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311, 313-14 (1970); George J. Stigler, The Economics of
Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213, 220-24 (1961).
2. See Venessa Bowman Pierce, If It Walks Like a Duck and Quacks Like a Duck,
Shouldn't It Be a Duck?: How a "Functional"Approach Ameliorates the Discontinuity Between
the "Primary Significance"Tests for Genericness and Secondary Meaning, 37 N.M. L. REV. 147,
149 (2007).
3. Mira Wilkins, The Neglected Intangible Asset: The Influence of the Trade Mark on the
Rise of the Modern Corporation, Bus. HIST., Jan. 1992, at 66, 87-88.
4. Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1839, 1844 (2007).
5. See Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis: Balancing
Intellectual Property Rights at the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 575, 575 (2007)
[hereinafter Burk & McDonnell, Goldilocks]; see also Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell,
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of intellectual property using the theory of the firm, particularly
property-based theories of the firm.6 However, we purposely set
aside trademark law due to its differences from other forms of
intellectual property, intending to take trademarks up separately.
We take up that delayed inquiry here, applying to trademarks the
analytical framework that we previously developed, while taking
into account the unusual aspects of trademark law that differentiate
them from other forms of intellectual property. We suggest here that
trademarks may have purposes, and certainly have effects, not only
as a signal to consumers, but also as a set of exclusive rights around
which organizations will be structured. Our discussion in this
Article is primarily directed to the standard law of trademark
confusion, while recognizing that trademark has in the last decade
begun to incorporate other theories of infringement.7
In following the framework we have previously employed for
considering the effects that exclusive rights have upon the size and
structure of firms, we consider the differential between transaction
costs inside and outside the firm, recognizing that it is possible to
have exclusive rights that are too strong or too weak in either
dimension.8 We briefly review this approach, as well as some salient
features of trademarks, in the first section. Using this background,
we then look at trademarks, first as an asset allocation mechanism
that may lower the transaction costs within a firm, and then as an
asset allocation mechanism that may lower transaction costs
between firms. We emphasize that the asset being allocated in the
case of trademarks is the reputational capital of the firm, more than
the trademark itself. Under this approach we identify a variety of
Patents, Tax Shelters, and the Firm, 26 VA. TAX REv. 981, 982-83 (2007) [hereinafter Burk &
McDonnell, Patents] (considering the theory of the firm in the context of tax patents).
6. Burk & McDonnell, Goldilocks, supra note 5, at 577; Burk & McDonnell, Patents,
supra note 5, at 983.
7. Giovanni Ramello & Francesco Silva, Appropriating Signs and Meaning: The Elusive
Economics of Trademark, 15 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 937, 948-49 (2006). Specifically, an
alternative model has emerged under the theory of "dilution," which deters encroachments
on the distinctiveness of famous marks, and has become a statutory claim under federal law.
4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:67 (4th
ed. 2009). Dilution is a sufficiently idiosyncratic latecomer to trademarks that we reserve
most of our comments about it for a future paper.
8. See Burk & McDonnell, Goldilocks, supra note 5, at 575, 577; see also Burk &
McDonnell, Patents, supra note 5, at 983 (applying the same analysis to firms using tax
method patents).
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trademark doctrines that we believe will affect the boundaries of the
firm in positive or negative ways.
I. TRADEMARKS AND THE FIRM
In order to consider the effects of trademarks on the size and
structure of firms, we must first consider the points at which an
analysis of trademarks might depart from our previous analyses of
other forms of intellectual property. We therefore begin our dis-
cussion in this section with a brief overview of certain idiosyncratic
aspects of trademark law. We then review our earlier arguments
regarding intellectual property and the theory of the firm, particu-
larly the framework we have developed for considering the effects
of intellectual property on transaction costs within firms and
between firms. We note several peculiarities of trademarks when
analyzed under the theory of the firm; these idiosyncracies will be
key to our discussion of trademarks and transaction costs.
A. Characteristics of Trademarks
Trademarks may constitute any type of word, symbol, logo,
design, or even color or smell, that evokes an association with the
source of goods or services.9 The public reputation and goodwill of
the source are important components of such an association.1"
Trademark rights accrue as the mark is used in commerce affixed
to goods or associated with services. The mark accrues protection as
consumers grow to recognize the mark and associate it with the
source of goods or services.11 The core legal regime for trademark
protection is state law; 2 however, federal recognition and augmen-
tation of these rights has become increasingly important with the
development of a national and international economy. Since the
early twentieth century, federal law has provided for registration of
trademarks in the United States Trademark Office. Federal regis-
tration confers a number of legal advantages on the trademark
9. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 3:1.
10. Id. § 3:2.
11. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 16:1.
12. Id. §§ 16:1, 16:2.
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holder, most especially nationwide constructive notice of the regis-
trant's priority of use.13
Technically, marks that identify products come in different
categories; trademarks designate goods whereas service marks
designate services.4 While trademarks and service marks are
distinguishable in some respects, such as the practical requirements
for legal recognition,15 their status is for the most part legally
equivalent, 6 and we will treat them as largely indistinguishable in
our analysis here. Federal law also covers some other types of
specialized marks, such as certification marks that are used by
certifying entities to indicate goods and services meeting a par-
ticular standard. 17 For the most part we will not deal with such
specialized marks here, although we will make some comments
about certification marks.'8
In order to function as a trademark, a source indicator must be
distinctive; distinction is sometimes presumed and sometimes
acquired via what is termed "secondary meaning."' 9 Secondary
meaning is the association in the minds of consumers between the
mark and the source of the product.2" Marks that are assumed
to carry distinction inherently, say "Viagra" or "Sunkist," have no
meaning other than to identify their associated goods.2' Other
marks, with potential for multiple associations, must earn sec-
ondary meaning from association with products in the marketplace
over time." This is the case for marks that describe the goods;23 in
the beginning, they may describe many goods in a given class, such
as "Holsum" (a homonym for "wholesome") bread. But over time
13. Id. § 16:2.
14. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 3:1.
15. For example, under U.S. law, trademarks must be affixed to goods; for obvious
reasons, service marks need not be. See Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006); 1
MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 4:14.
16. 1 McCARTHY, supra note 7, § 4:14.
17. Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 4:15.
18. See infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
19. 2 McCARTHY, supra note 7, § 15:1.
20. Id. § 15:5.
21. Id. § 15:150.
22. Id.
23. Id. § 11:25.
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they gain secondary meaning as being associated with only a
particular brand of bread from a particular source.
Some commentators have pointed out that the term "secondary
meaning" is often a misnomer; frequently the primary or cardinal
meaning of the mark in the minds of consumers is its association
with the source of the products accompanying the mark.2 4 But the
designation may be ordinal more than cardinal. Certainly for
fanciful marks, such as "Exxon," which have no meaning in any
language other than to indicate the source of goods and services,
that meaning is the first, last, and only meaning associated with the
mark.25 But in the case of descriptive marks, the term first indicates
the type of goods and only later is associated with the source.26 The
same is true for arbitrary marks in a contextual sense; "apple" was
first the name of a fruit, until it was later placed into the context of
computer equipment, where it became associated with a particular
brand of computer.
Thus, trademarks connect products to source, but it is worth
noting that "source" is a somewhat circular term of art in trademark
law, indicating the originator of marked goods and services to which
consumers would attribute the marked products.27 Consumers need
not know the identity or location of a source to know that there is a
source from which marked goods originate and to expect particular
characteristics and quality of goods from that source.2" The source
of goods or services could constitute an individual, a single firm,
a collection of firms, or a particular chain of supply. A source need
not even be a manufacturer; it may be a distributor. Black letter
trademark law is insistent that a trademark be associated with only
a single source, not multiple sources.29 This association with a
unitary legal fiction has more to do with consistency and control of
supply than with the organizational or legal form of a producer, but
the requirement will be critical to our discussion here.
The reputational signaling function of trademarks entails some-
thing of a paradox: although rights are secured to the trademark
24. Id. § 15:6.
25. Id. § 11:4.
26. Id. § 15:6.
27. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 3:9.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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owner, they are ostensibly directed toward benefitting the public.
This may not seem unusual in itself; other forms of intellectual
property certainly have a public interest component. Patents and
copyrights are specifically directed to promote the progress of
science and the useful arts. This has been interpreted by the
Supreme Court as meaning that these exclusive rights are directed
ultimately to the benefit of the public, and only incidentally to the
benefit of authors and inventors that are awarded the exclusive
rights.3 ' But trademarks have a very immediate and direct justifica-
tion for consumer benefit: preventing consumers from being
mistaken or defrauded by confusingly similar signals.
This distinction from other intellectual property arises because
trademarks are directed to quite a different set of assets than other
intellectual property. Patents, copyrights, and even trade secrets
are ostensibly granted as legal incentives to promote and secure
investments in new knowledge, new technologies, new creative
works, and new business information." Trademarks, in contrast,
promote and secure business reputation and goodwill by securing a
mnemonic device between products and source.33 It is possible that
trademarks may indirectly contribute to investment in product
innovation and improvement by ensuring that consumers will
recognize those products and that consumer goodwill cannot be
deceptively redirected to competing products. 34 Trademark holders
may therefore be more willing to invest in product quality and
differentiation.
Nonetheless, courts and commentators are essentially unanimous
in recognizing that trademarks serve primarily as signals rather
than incentives. 36 From the standpoint of economics, trademarks are
30. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); Mazer v.
Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
31. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 2:33.
32. Id. § 6:3.
33. Id.; see also Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995).
34. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective,
30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 280 (1987).
35. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78
TRADEMARK REP. 267, 271 (1988).
36. See, e.g., Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 163-64; WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 168 (2003).
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generally viewed as signals that lower consumer search costs. 31
Stated differently, the purpose of granting exclusive rights in
trademarks is not to produce better trademarks, or at least not
necessarily to produce better trademarks; the rights granted in the
sign or symbol are not intended to promote progress in the indicia
they cover.3" Rather, protecting trademarks has generally been
viewed as a means to foster associations in the minds of consumers
between the mark, as a signal, and a certain source of goods or
services. Thus, trademark law contains a substantial component
of consumer protection, and this has long been recognized as an
important function of trademarks-deterring the deception or
defrauding of consumers by "passing off" one type of goods for
another.39
This also means that, acting as signals, trademarks are in some
sense a step removed from the assets they secure. Like other forms
of intellectual property, trademarks entail a right to exclude, a
property right.4" Like other forms of intellectual property, trade-
marks are instrumental; they exist primarily to secure exclusive
rights in socially desirable intangible assets.4 But the expectation
is that a patent or copyright will produce better inventions or
creative works; such exclusivity is intended to promote progress in
the artifacts actually covered by the exclusive right. The exclusive
rights in trademarks preserve consumer signals and business
goodwill associated with the indicia covered by trademark rights.42
In other words, the designator secured by trademark rights may
have value as an asset, but its value depends on the reputational
asset behind it.
There has been some movement in recent years toward treating
trademarks themselves as property rather than as signals.43 This
has been most apparent in the context of sports sponsorships, where
37. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 36, at 168.
38. See Ramello & Silva, supra note 7, at 941.
39. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 3:6.
40. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089 (1972).
41. See Ramello & Silva, supra note 7, at 941.
42. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 2:15.
43. Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE
L.J. 1687, 1687-88 (1999).
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courts have extended trademark protection to the use of team logos
on various types of apparel and goods, even though the logos have
no real bearing on the source of the goods.44 Consumers likely do not
believe that team logos indicate the source of the caps or t-shirts on
which the logos appear; the logos are rather valued simply for
themselves, as indications of team loyalty or personal affiliation.
Treatment of trademarks as independent property is also apparent
in claims for dilution.45 Dilution recognizes that the value of certain
famous marks will be diminished if they are used too often in the
marketplace; unauthorized but nonconfusing uses can be restricted
by the mark owner in order to preserve the mark's distinctiveness.46
Despite these trends, an important strain of consumer protection
remains the mainstay of trademark doctrine. And as a consequence,
to the extent that trademarks constitute a property right, they are
an unusual property right.4" The exclusive rights under trademark
law are in substantial measure dependent upon the perception of
consumers: trademark owners have a right to exclude others from
using the mark only to the extent that consumers are likely to be
confused by similar marks, only to the extent that consumers
perceive the mark as associated with a given source, and only to the
extent that consumers do not incorporate the mark into the
language as part of common speech.48 This might seem to make
trademark law consumer oriented rather than business oriented;
nonetheless, trademarks remain a key asset for modern firms.
B. The Theory of the irm
The standard property-based conception of the firm that we have
previously relied on holds that firms exist because of the savings in
transaction costs generated by a hierarchical production structure.49
Beginning with Coase, the theory of the firm developed to explain
why market transactions are not used as the mechanism to coor-
44. See, e.g., Natl Football League Props., Inc. v. Witchita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F.
Supp. 651 (W.D. Wash. 1982); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 3:4.
45. See Lemley, supra note 43, at 1698-99.
46. See Lanham Act § 30, 15 U.S.C. § 1112 (2006); 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 24:67.
47. Ramello & Silva, supra note 7, at 944.
48. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, §§ 2:14, 2:15.
49. Burk & McDonnell, Goldilocks, supra note 5, at 587.
353
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
dinate all productive activity.5" Coase postulated that in some
instances, entrepreneurial fiat direction would be less costly than
market negotiations due to the transaction costs of the market.51 In
such cases, competitive pressures will tend to compel the formation
of firms as market participants organize themselves to minimize
inefficiencies or face displacement by competitors that have orga-
nized themselves into firms.52
Commentators expanding upon Coase's insight have identified
opportunism as one of the key transaction costs associated with
bargaining in the marketplace.53 Parties to a transaction cannot
anticipate all future contingencies, and it would be prohibitively
expensive for them to try. As a consequence, any contract they nego-
tiate will be incomplete.54 One or the other party may attempt to
take advantage of unforeseen developments; in particular, a party
to a contract may attempt to 'hold up" the other party, extorting
additional concessions once resources have been committed to a
project and cannot be easily recommitted to another venture.55 Such
relationship-specific resources, by virtue of their tailoring to a par-
ticular project, increase the efficiency of projects, but at the same
time create the potential for opportunism.56 Generalized resources
may be more easily recommitted to new uses but are less well suited
to any given project.57 Thus, in the face of possible "hold-ups," there
may be an undesirable incentive to avoid asset specificity.
50. See R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937), reprinted in R. H.
COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAw 33, 35-41 (1988).
51. Id. at 40.
52. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 233-34 (1996).
53. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMICINSTITUTIONSOFCAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS,
RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 30 (1985) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS];
Oliver Hart, An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1757,
1765 (1989). As Harold Demsetz points out, Coase appears to regard opportunism as only one
of the costs that might impel the formation of firms. HAROLD DEMSETZ, THE ECONOMICS OF
THE BUSINESS FIRM: SEVEN CRITICAL COMMENTARIES 20 (1995).
54. Oliver D. Hart, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the irm, in THE NATURE OF
THE FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT 138,141 (Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney
G. Winter eds., 1991).
55. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 53, at 76, 133-34; see also Lloyd
Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 351,362 (1991) (describing the "hold-out"
problem).
56. See Benpamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the
Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297,298 (1978) (discussing asset specificity).
57. Dan L. Burk, Intellectual Property and the Firm, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 6 (2004).
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When transaction costs, including the threat of hold-up, are
comparatively high, firms may attempt to avoid a market transac-
tion by integrating production functions within the firm.5" When
market transactions are comparatively low, firms will tend to "dis-
integrate," outsourcing production functions. 9 Thus, the theory of
the firm helps predict and explain the size and structure of firms.
Such predictions are dependent on understanding the factors that
may raise or lower transaction costs, including the legal and
regulatory regime under which a firm operates.
Thus, law becomes an important consideration in determining
the structure of firms. In particular, one of the "gap-fillers" that
offers a fallback resolution for unforeseen and unnegotiated con-
tingencies is a property rule: property, including intellectual
property, is allocated to a title holder in the absence of some
contractual provision to the contrary. Property rules may lower
uncertainty in the marketplace, which in turn lowers transactions
costs. When the cost of a production transaction in the market is
lowered relative to the cost of production by managerial fiat, firms
will be more likely to "buy" an input than to "make" the input; that
production function need not be brought within the structure of the
firm, and so the firm will be smaller than it might be otherwise.
Independent firms that supply the given input are also more likely
to arise. Property rules, by lowering market transaction costs, can
facilitate these outcomes. All other factors being equal, property
rules should tend to produce smaller firms that outsource produc-
tion functions.
Property defaults may be especially important where valuable
information is at issue. Unlike the situation where a dispute arises
over physical assets, and possession of those assets can form the
basis for allocation of its use, physical possession of information is
less certain. Information may be embodied in tangible form, but
once such information is disclosed, both parties effectively have
access to its use. This may create a reluctance to disclose valuable
information, as Kenneth Arrow observed in his famous Information
Disclosure Paradox.6 ° Intellectual property rules may help break the
58. Burk & McDonnell, Goldilocks, supra note 5, at 613.
59. Id.
60. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in
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disclosure impasse by allocating legal rights in disclosed informa-
tion.6
Additionally, given that many of the contracts that define the firm
are contracts with employees, the theory of the firm applies as well
to employment situations addressing allocations of property within
the firm, that is, between the firm and employees. Employee con-
tracts, like vendor, customer, or business alliance contracts, will
necessarily be incomplete. 2 Not every situation will be anticipated;
in particular, situations when employees might shirk their duties or
behave opportunistically may not be anticipated in the employment
contract. Employee opportunism may affect transaction costs with-
in the firm, pushing them toward the costs of negotiation in the
marketplace. As with transactions between firms, property defaults
can lower such costs by allocating resources between firm and
employees in situations that might otherwise be unclear.
Moreover, we have observed in previous work that while prop-
erty rights work to lower transaction costs up to a point, beyond
that point excessive property rights, or property rights in the
wrong configuration, can work to increase transaction costs.
63
Commentators in a variety of fields have observed that frag-
mented rights may create a prohibitive anticommons that impede
a business's freedom to operate.' Clearing a large number of
licenses or obtaining a large number of permissions itself generates
transaction costs. 65 Owners of fragmented rights may also be
inclined to '%old out" for an excessive share of the gains from trade;
when all the holders of fragmented rights engage in such strategic
behavior, negotiation becomes impossible. 6 In a similar fashion,
property rights that secure a firm's assets against employee op-
portunism can, at some point, impose excessive restrictions on
employee innovation and incentive. Property rules can hamper or
NATL BUREAU OF ECON. RES., THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609, 614-16
(1962).
61. See Burk & McDonnell, Goldilocks, supra note 5, at 600-01.
62. See Hart, supra note 53, at 1765.
63. Burk & McDonnell, Goldilocks, supra note 5, at 614-17, 619.
64. MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONoMY: How TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS
MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES (2008).
65. Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 907, 927 (2004).
66. Id. at 926-29.
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restrict an employee's ability to function well in her job, increase job
dissatisfaction, and even deter recruitment of employees who fear
that their best work and most valuable skills will be cemented to
the firm and no longer portable to new job opportunities. When
multiplied over myriad employees, this drag on employee mobility
could potentially hamper the circulation of ideas and talent in entire
sectors, stifling the development of innovative industries.
This observation that property rights may lower both inter- and
intra-firm transaction costs up to a point, but then increase those
costs beyond that point, leads to what we call the "Goldilocks
hypothesis." 7 For both types of transactions, there is a certain level
of property right protection that minimizes inter- or intra-firm
transaction costs.6" Rights that are weaker or stronger than the
optimal level will increase costs and may lead to substitution away
from either inter- or intra-firm transactions, depending on which
kind of transaction has a more suboptimal level of legal regime. 9
We have previously applied this framework to consider the role
of copyright, patent, and trade secrecy law in shaping the bound-
aries and structures of firms. The framework applies to trademark
law as well. However, trademarks affect firm boundaries and
structures somewhat differently than other forms of intellectual
property. The role of trademarks under the theory of the firm has
not gone altogether unremarked. Oliver Hart, one of the primary
originators of the property rights theory of the firm that underlies
our use of the theory of the firm in this and previous articles, points
out that firms need to own some sort of tangible or intangible
property other than workers' human capital in order to provide a
"glue" that holds the firm together.7 ° Without such glue, there is
nothing to keep workers with the firm.71 Workers work for a firm in
order to get access to some sort of asset that makes their activity
more valuable than it would be on its own." Some of these assets
are hard physical assets-machines, buildings, and so on. Others
are soft intangible assets, such as patents and client lists. Hart lists
67. Burk & McDonnell, Goldilocks, supra note 5, at 577.
68. Id. at 620.
69. Id. at 620-24.
70. OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 57 (1995).
71. Id. at 56-57.
72. Id. at 57.
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a firm's name or reputation among the latter.13 Intriguingly, though,
he notes that name or reputation does not fit as straightforwardly
within his economic model as other assets and that further work
needs to be done to explain the value of firm reputation.74
Some progress in this direction has been provided in the growing
literature on the reputational assets of firms.7 5 Changes in firm
management are often undetectable to consumers, especially if the
firm continues to operate under the same name or using the same
mark. If consumers are unable to detect changes in management,
then one might expect the development of adverse selection-a
classic "market for lemons" in which the only trademarks available
are those associated with poorly managed firms-and, knowing this,
only poorly managed firms would offer their trademarks for sale on
the market.7" Alternatively, one might expect a market for trade-
marks to be subject to a form of "moral hazard," in which poor
managers acquire good marks in order to purvey substandard goods
or services to unsuspecting consumers.77 But the literature analyz-
ing the potential for such effects suggests that robust markets for
reputation can emerge, and that trademarks can in fact serve as a
point of stability for firm reputation whether observable or un-
observable transitions in management occur.78
73. Id.
74. Id. at 56 n.1; see also Oliver Hart, Norms and the Theory of the Firm 17-18 (Harvard
Inst. of Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 1923, 2001), available at http://www.
economics.harvard.edu/pub/hier/2001/HIER1923.pdf (identifying the origins of the firm's
reputational assets as an open question).
75. See, e.g., Hendrick Hakenes & Martin Peitz, Observable Reputation Trading, 48 INT'L
ECON. REV. 693 (2007); David Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in
PERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 90 (J. Alt & K. Shepsle eds., 1990); Steven
Tadelis, What's in a Name? Reputation as a Tradeable Asset, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 548 (1999).
For an overview, see Heski Bar-Isaac & Steven Tadelis, Seller Reputation, 4 FOUNDATIONS &
TRENDS MICROECON. 273 (2008).
76. See Bar-Isaac & Tadelis, supra note 75, at 275-76; see also George A. Aklerof, The
Market for "Lemons" Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488
(1970) (describing how market uncertainty can be expected to drive out high quality products).
77. See Bar-Isaac & Tadelis, supra note 75, at 276-77.
78. See Hakenes & Pietz, supra note 75; Tadelis, supra note 75. But see Howard P. Marvel
& Lixin Ye, Trademark Sales, Entry, and the Value of Reputation, 49 INT'L ECON. REV. 547,
548 (2008) (finding in a dilution model that trademark selling lowers overall welfare).
Although the law draws a distinction between trademarks and trade names, the literature
on firm reputation for the most part fails to draw this distinction. In this Article, we focus on
the rules governing trademarks, recognizing that the analysis as applied to the firm may
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Trademarks present an unusual situation with regard to prop-
erty "defaults" because of their distinctive exclusion and disclosure
qualities noted above: trademarks are (usually) not goods in them-
selves, but instruments for conveying the reputation or goodwill of
a firm.79 The issue with regard to trademarks is less the misappro-
priation of the trademark itself, but rather the misappropriation of
the goodwill represented by the mark. Such reputation may be seen
as a production factor for either goods or services. In a business
alliance where a trademark is one of the production factors supplied
by one party, there is potential for misappropriation, but such
defection is unlike the "hold-up" that can occur after disclosure of an
idea or trade secret-these factors can be appropriated as soon as
they are disclosed to the contracting partner. Trademarks require
public recognition, which entails public disclosure of the mark in
order to be effective-there are no secret trademarks. ° In this
sense, trademarks are somewhat like patents or published copy-
righted works; trademark licensees are never bargaining for dis-
closure.
As we have indicated, property-based theories of the firm consider
the firm as a repository of residual property rights in cases of hold-
up or bargaining breakdown."' Thus, a firm's investment in an asset
depends heavily upon the project specificity of that asset, that is, the
degree to which it can be redeployed to a different project when
business conditions change. Assets that are highly project specific
are difficult to redeploy to a new purpose and place the firm in
danger of hold-up: once firms have invested in a project specific
asset, that investment will be lost if the specific project fails, and a
business partner can use the threat of such a loss to demand
additional concessions once the assets have been committed.
Trademarks are simultaneously highly specific and yet eminently
redeployable assets. The differential qualities of trademark rede-
ployment depend upon the intersection of the physical instantiation
of the mark, the rights that have been perfected in the mark, and
the goodwill associated with the mark. In one sense the redeploy-
extend to other reputational devices.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 10-11.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 10-11.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 63-65.
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ment of a trademark is trivial; it takes only the signature on a
license or the submission of registration documents to move a logo,
name, or catch phrase from one owner to another. Or, in precisely
the kind of misappropriation that trademark law is intended to
prohibit, it may be equally trivially easy to affix an unauthorized
label or logo to goods that do not originate from the trademark
owner.
The rights and use of a mark may therefore seem to be a nonspe-
cific asset. This is less true of the physical embodiment of the mark.
For example, in the general course of business, commercial airliners
or vehicles may be fungibly redeployed among carriers for the
purpose of carrying passengers or cargo-hence a firm is more likely
to lease than to own such assets. But repurposing such assets is not
entirely costless; ownership of an aircraft may be changed with the
stroke of a pen, but altering the livery of the aircraft may be
somewhat more expensive. The use of the aircraft is fungible, but
the branding is not and may be costly to change.
Conversely, sale of the trademark that does not include sale of
the asset may require a costly branding change-the physical asset
has not changed hands, but the owner can no longer display the
identifiers that now belong to another entity. This is a common
problem of "specific assets" in the trademark area. One of the
parties to a trademark license may have invested in specialized
assets bearing the trademark or trade dress. Employee uniforms,
neon signage, restaurant d6cor, even buildings distinctively shaped
like a hotdog or bearing the "golden arches" may be expensive
physical instantiations of the mark that are hard to repurpose if a
business relationship falls apart.
Trademark licensing does not seem altogether unusual in these
respects. Versions of the problem are familiar to any redeployment
of business assets; they often must be moved to a new location or
altered to fit a new configuration. Sale or transfer of other types of
intellectual property also often involves separate transfer of rights
along with the transfer of a physical asset as might occur with the
sale of a patented machine or the licensing of a text or computer
program protected by copyright. But in the case of trademarks, a
third characteristic of the mark may make redeployment difficult,
that is that the goodwill associated with the mark may be "stickier"
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than the mark itself. Such goodwill exists in the minds of consumers
rather than in a legal document or registration,82 and consumers
may naturally resist purchasing a familiar commodity at a new
location or hearing an otherwise familiar advertising slogan in the
mouth of a new spokesman.
Certainly some other types of intellectual property may also
protect reputational interests.83 For example, we have previously
noted that copyright assists in structuring transaction costs within
the firm.' Copyright's "work made for hire" doctrine serves to allo-
cate control of firm assets within the firm, automatically assigning
to the firm control over employee work product.8" However, the
doctrine does so by the mechanism of designating the firm as
author.86 In copyright, authorship encompasses both an allocational
and a reputational function. In such cases, the reputational interest
associated with the work may be of little interest to the firm, but of
considerably higher value to the actual author, such that ownership
and attribution might be bifurcated.8
In the case of trademarks, it is the firm's reputational interest
that is the primary consideration. This suggests that the repu-
tational association of the mark deserves special consideration.
Some previous commentary has suggested that trademarks,
comprising a property type of rule, should facilitate outsourcing of
production; that because of the residual rights in trademarks,
trademark holders will be more willing to "buy" rather than "make"
products bearing the mark.88 While not necessarily disagreeing with
this previous analysis, we find the emphasis misplaced. In our
previous consideration of intellectual property and the firm, we have
applied a residual rights theory to analyze the role of exclusive
rights in partitioning assets associated with the firm.89 We believe
the same approach is applicable to the exclusive rights associated
82. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 15:5.
83. See Laura A. Heymann, The Birth of the Authornym: Authorship, Pseudonymity, and
Trademark Law, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1377, 1392-94 (2005); Greg Lastowka, The
Trademark Function of Authorship, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1214 (2005).
84. Burk & McDonnell, Goldilocks, supra note 5, at 610.
85. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006).
86. See id.
87. See Burk, supra note 57, at 14-15.
88. David J. Brennan, The Trade Mark and the Firm, 3 INT. PROP. Q. 283 (2006).
89. Burk & McDonnell, Goldilocks, supra note 5, at 581.
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with trademarks, but neither the mark nor the products to which
the mark is affixed are the relevant assets. Rather, it is the par-
tition of goodwill and reputation associated with the firm that is at
issue in considering the effect of trademark law on the size and
structure of the firm. Trademarks serve as a trigger or signal for
such goodwill; allocation of the trademark and its use will help to
partition such goodwill, but allocating the mark is only a means to
that end.
Additionally, focusing solely on the external effects of trademark
law neglects the potential for trademarks to lower transaction costs
within the firm and concomitantly neglects the cost differential be-
tween transaction costs inside and outside the firm. As in the case
of inter-firm transactions, the situation for intra-firm transactions
involving trademarks differs somewhat from those involving inven-
tions, know-how, or creative works. Opportunistic employees may
take the firm's know-how to a new job or appropriate firm technol-
ogy to their own uses in starting a new business. But opportunistic
employee behavior will seldom involve surreptitious pilfering of a
trademark because, in order to function as a signal, trademark use
must be largely open and notorious.
As we have seen in our review of the theory of the firm above, it
is the comparison of costs of transacting between and within firms
that matters. If trademarks lower both sets of costs, then to assess
the effect on firm integration or dis-integration, one must consider
which set of costs trademark law might lower more. Thus, in the
next set of sections we consider both kinds of transactions in turn,
starting with the effects of trademarks on intra-firm transactions.
Our testbed for analyzing the effects of trademarks on the boundary
of the firm will be situations in which reputation is a key asset and
there is potential for hold-up by one or both parties to a transaction.
We will be looking for ways in which trademark law allows alloca-
tion or redeployment of resources in ways that mitigate hold-up or
otherwise lower a firm's transaction costs.
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II. INTRA-FIRM EFFECTS
Having highlighted several important features of trademark law,
we now turn to the effects of trademarks on transactional costs
within the firm, that is, in the transactions between the firm and its
personnel. The positive reputation associated with a trademark is
due to the work of many persons associated with the firm owning
that mark over time. A variety of persons within a firm may help or
hurt the reputation of the business, and at the same time the
actions of the firm may affect the personal reputation of its employ-
ees. Individual employees may try to appropriate to themselves
some of the positive reputation produced by a mark. Firms, in turn,
may not always appropriately compensate their employees for the
work they have done in helping to build the value of the firm's
marks. Both sides may attempt to take advantage of the other. An
important task for the law is partitioning goodwill or reputation of
the firm as an asset from the personal goodwill or reputation of the
employee.
This allocation problem is well known in many other areas of
business law.s° The separation of personal goodwill and firm good-
will is a distinction appearing in tax, bankruptcy, and business
association law; all have recognized a distinction between the
personal goodwill of an employee and the business goodwill of the
firm.91 For example, when partners in a law practice dissolve the
practice, each is entitled to a share of the partnership's professional
goodwill as an asset of the business, but goodwill is only an asset of
the business to the extent that it is separate and distinct from the
reputation of the individual partner.9" In taxing corporate value or
distributions, tax court decisions similarly distinguish the personal
ability and reputation of individual employees from corporate
intangible assets.93 These decisions suggest that personal goodwill
can sometimes be reduced to a corporate asset by means of an
90. See Thomas 0. Wells & Daniel Lambert, Sale of Personal Goodwill-The Executive's
Parachute, FLA. BAR J., Mar. 2005, at 31, 34-35.
91. See id.
92. See Thompson v. Thompson, 576 So. 2d 267, 270 (Fla. 1991).
93. Martin Ice Cream Co. v. Comm'r, 110 T.C. 189, 207-08 (1998); Norwalk v. Comm'r, 76
T.C.M. (CCH) 208, No. 20685-96, 1998 WL 430084, at *8 (July 20, 1998).
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employment agreement, such as a noncompetition agreement that
would prevent the employee from servicing clients with whom she
has a personal relationship from her previous firm when she leaves
for a new firm. 4 But absent such an instrument, the personal
relationships of an employee with clients reside only with the
employee and have no taxable value to the employer.95 Similarly, in
the context of bankruptcy law, the ability of employees to transfer
customers to a new employer has been held to constitute a matter
of personal goodwill, and not a corporate asset subject to the claims
of creditors.96
Trademark law may similarly attempt to draw lines between
personal and business reputation. How the line gets drawn affects
the incentives of both firms and their employees to invest resources
in creating a strong reputation. We have previously noted the effect
of intellectual property regimes to specific intangible assets devel-
oped by employees for the firm, and the more general personal
assets that the employee should retain claim to in the labor
market.97 Where trademarks are concerned, such a bifurcation is far
less simple, as the primary legal justification for trademark law is
to preserve and to signal reputation.9" Where employee reputation
and firm reputation are bound up in the same signal, accommodat-
ing both interests may be difficult or impossible. And where the
interests of an employee and the interests of the firm diverge, it will
sometimes be unclear how to partition personal from business
reputations. We next examine several such situations in which
personal and business reputation are intertwined, and consider the
functioning of trademark law in setting defaults to allocate reputa-
tion between the firm and its employees.
94. See Martin Ice Cream Co., 110 T.C. at 207; Norwalk, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 208, 1998 WL
430084, at *8.
95. See Martin Ice Cream Co., 110 T.C. at 207-08; Norwalk, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 208, 1998
WL 430084, at *8.
96. See Corrugated Paper Corp. v. E. Container Corp., 185 B.R. 667,671 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1995).
97. See Burk & McDonnell, Goldilocks, supra note 5, at 591-600; Burk, supra note 57, at
8-9.
98. See supra text accompanying note 42.
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A. The Closely Held Mark
The first situation we consider in which personal and business
reputation coincide occurs where the identifying mark of the
business coincides with the personal name or identifier of an em-
ployee. Some businesses adopt as their mark the name, likeness, or
personal attributes of a given individual. The person from whom the
mark is derived will often be the founder of the business or a
celebrity whose creative output comprises the major product or
service purveyed by the business. Hewlett-Packard, Lucasfilm, and
the Jonas Brothers all owe their business designators to the per-
sonal names of founding entrepreneurs, but these designators are
now firm assets in addition to being personal names.
In this Article we refer to such marks as being "closely held," in
much the same way that businesses that have their governance
associated with a particular manager may be "closely held." Here we
use the term not so much in the sense of ownership or decision
making-although businesses with closely held marks are perhaps
more likely to be closely held in the corporate sense-but in the
sense that the goodwill and reputation of the firm may be tightly
associated with the reputation and public perception of the founder.
Because the closely held mark refers to both the firm and the
eponymous founder, the overlapping reputational interests present
a series of potential issues when it becomes necessary to differenti-
ate between the use of the mark to refer to the firm and the use of
the name to refer to the individual.99
1. Personal and Business Reputation
Perhaps the most common situation in which personal and
business reputation requires partitioning is the scenario in which
an entrepreneur launches a business under a closely held mark such
as a personal name, then leaves or sells that business and desires
to establish a second business in the same product market under the
same or similar name. This is a scenario in which the public is most
likely to be aware of changes in firm management.' 0 For example,
99. See Ramello & Silva, supra note 7, at 946.
100. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
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in 1973 entrepreneur Steve Herrell launched Steve's Ice Cream
stores in the Boston area, offering premium ice cream and innova-
tive "mix in" ingredients that were added to the ice cream as
selected by customers at the time of purchase.'' Herrell sold the
business in 1977, but quickly reentered the same market with a new
chain of stores, offering the same products and services, again in the
Boston area. °2 Unable to use his first name, which had been
conveyed as a mark with the sale of the initial ice cream chain,
Herrell called his new stores "Herrell's Ice Cream.''
In some cases, the reputation and goodwill of the firm may rest
almost entirely on the personal reputation of a founding entrepre-
neur, such that a change in the founder's reputation may impact
the eponymous firm. This was dramatically illustrated in the
recent history of Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, a business
built around the talents and personality of its founder, Martha
Stewart.' °4 The products and reputation of the firm were so closely
bound up with the personality of Martha Stewart that there was
considerable trepidation as to whether the firm would survive when
its founder was convicted and served prison time on false state-
ments and obstruction of justice charges.' °5
The Martha Stewart example suggests how the reputation and
goodwill of a firm may be impacted by the activity of a key em-
ployee. But sometimes the reputational impact may run the other
direction. For example, if Bill Marriott founds a hotel chain branded
with his name, subsequent decisions by the officers and directors of
the firm may reflect on Marriott the founder even if he no longer in
fact has decisional authority, due to having been out voted or even
having been bought out. For example, if Marriott is a member of a
religious denomination that forbids the consumption of coffee and
alcohol, as well as discourages the viewing of pornography,' °6 his
101. See Herrells.com, Historyof Harrell's, http://www.herreUs.comdesignindex.php?lv=28
(last visited Oct. 12, 2009).
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Will a Short Sentence Prove Sweet for Stock?, N.Y. TIMES, July
18, 2004, at C6.
105. See id.
106. Which in fact he is, being a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day
Saints ("Mormons"). See Marriott Asked Not To Show Adult Movies, YAHOO! NEWS, Apr. 10,
2008, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap-travel/20080410/ap-tr-ge/travel-brief-marriott-adult-
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reputation and standing in his religious community could be
affected if the hotel chain bearing his name begins to offer coffee,
alcohol, and adult pay-per-view movies to its guests. Similarly, if
Walt Disney cedes control of his eponymous firm to officers who
decide to produce more risqu6, less family-friendly entertainment,
the general public may mistake this business decision for a
reflection of the tastes or motives of the individual whose name has
become associated with the business.
10 7
While the effects in these examples are limited to largely ethical
or moral reputational capital, they could also affect the employee's
business reputation or earning potential. Such issues might occur
with regard to a change in a business's target audience or a re-
duction in product quality once the founder of a particular business
cedes a name mark to a firm. For example, if Debbie Fields
relinquishes the "Mrs. Fields" mark for freshly baked cookies to the
corporation, and the new officers decide to change the ingredients
of the product or move into the market for preserved, packaged
cookies produced for grocery store shelves, the downgrade in quality
may be a calculated business strategy on the part of the firm, but it
may also have an effect on Debbie Fields's personal reputation,
either as a business founder or as a baker. 10 8
movies. During his presidential campaign, Marriott's fellow Mormon conservative Mitt
Romney was also criticized for failing to curb hotel room pornography while serving on the
board of the Marriott corporation. See Glen Johnson, Romney Criticized for Hotel
Pornography, WASH. POST, July 6, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2007/07/05/AR2007070501305.html; Ben Weyl, Romney's Ties to Marriott's Porn and
Mormonism Could Pose Problem for Iowa Social Conservatives, IOWA INDEP., July 15, 2007,
http://iowaindependent.com/560/romneys-ties-to-marriotts-porn-and-.mormonism-could-pose-
problem-for-iowa-social-conservatives. Bill Marriott recently faced the reverse problem when
his church endorsed California's Proposition 8 legislation to prevent same-sex marriage, and
he attempted to distinguish Marriott corporate policy from his own affiliations. Marriott on
the Move, The Facts About Marriott and California's Proposition 8, http://www.blogs.marriott.
comdefault.asp?item=2284808 (Nov. 11, 2008, 16:17:19 EST).
107. In fact, the Disney corporation created a differently named subsidiary, Touchstone
Pictures, to insulate the family oriented Disney brand from the release of movies such as
Splash, which contained brief nudity and adult situations. See Wade Sampson, Ron Miller and
Touchstone (Nov. 29,2006), http://www.mouseplanet.com/8170fRon_Miller-andTouchstone.
108. See Amanda Gaines, Mrs. Fields: We're Back, RETAIL-MERCHANDISER, Dec. 18, 2008,
http://www.retail-merchandiser.com/index.php?option=comcontent&view=
article&id=251:mrs-fields-were-back&catid=107:current&Itemid=298 (discussing unsuccessful
packaged grocery retail product).
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These tensions have implications for firm governance. If the
namesake of a corporation continues to control the business, some-
times the namesake may want to pursue goals that are incompatible
with maximizing the firm's profits. Minority shareholders may
object. Corporate law sometimes has to deal with such questions
concerning possible divergences in interest between a corporation
and its namesake. The general rule is that courts will not allow a
corporate director or officer to gain financially at the expense of the
corporation as that would violate the duty of loyalty. 19 However, if
the namesake is pursuing other goals that he strongly believes in at
the expense of profit maximization, courts will usually allow such
actions via their application of the business judgment rule."' A
prototypical example is Shlensky v. Wrigley."' In that case, a
minority shareholder of the Chicago National League Ball Club
(a.k.a. the Cubs) sued concerning the club's refusal to install lights
so that the Cubs could play night games." 2 Philip Wrigley was the
President and 80 percent owner of the team." 3 The team was not
named after Wrigley, but Wrigley Field, the site of the dispute, was.
The plaintiffs complained that Wrigley was pursuing goals other
than profit maximization." 4 Specifically, they alleged that Wrigley
personally had a traditionalist belief in baseball as a daytime sport
and that he was concerned with possible effects on the surrounding
neighborhood." 5
The court would have none of it. It noted that concern for the
neighborhood might conceivably be in the club's best long-run
interest and refused to second-guess Wrigley." 6 The court said that
unless the club's conduct at least bordered on fraud, illegality, or
conflict of interest, the court would abstain from reviewing the
club's decision." 7 Such a standard obviously gives the controlling
shareholder wide leeway to pursue whatever goals he likes without
109. See supra notes 106-08 and infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
110. See infra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
111. 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
112. Id. at 777.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 778.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 780.
117. Id.
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having to closely justify each decision as maximizing financial
returns to the business.
Courts do not always defer to the controller's will in such cases,
though. The most famous example is Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.1 '
Ford Motor was a phenomenally successful business dominated
by its founder and namesake, Henry Ford." 9 Ford made public
statements about the importance of making the fruits of the new
industrial system widely available to workers and consumers, hence
his desire to reduce the price of the cars he sold. 2 ° The Dodge
brothers were minority shareholders. 2 ' They complained about
Ford's refusal to declare a special dividend paying out the company's
huge accumulated profits and also about Ford's plans to build a
huge new plant at River Rouge, Michigan.'22
The court followed the usual business judgment rule course of not
second-guessing the decision to build a new plant;2 3 however, it did
order the corporation to pay out a special dividend, even though
dividend decisions are normally committed to the board's dis-
cretion.'24 In doing so, the court said:
The record, and especially the testimony of Mr. Ford, convinces
that he has to some extent the attitude towards shareholders of
one who has dispensed and distributed to them large gains and
that they should be content to take what he chooses to give. His
testimony creates the impression, also, that he thinks the Ford
Motor Company has made too much money, has had too large
profits, and that, although large profits might be still earned, a
sharing of them with the public, by reducing the price of the
output of the company, ought to be undertaken. We have no
doubt that certain sentiments, philanthropic and altruistic,
creditable to Mr. Ford, had large influence in determining the
policy to be pursued by the Ford Motor Company.
25
118. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
119. See id. at 671.
120. Id. at 683-84.
121. Id. at 669.
122. Id. at 671.
123. Id. at 684.
124. Id. at 685.
125. Id. at 683-84.
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Shlensky and Dodge are frequently discussed in the literature on
the proper objectives of a corporation. Although the prevailing view
is that the proper objective of corporations is to maximize the
financial returns to its shareholders, many point out that the
business judgment rule in practice allows corporations to pursue
different objectives (for example, helping employees, consumers, or
the community in which they are located) without judicial interfer-
ence.126 Dodge is the leading citation for the proposition that
maximizing return to shareholders is the proper objective of a
corporation. On the other side, scholars often point to Shlensky as
an example of the business judgment rule shielding decisions that
pursue goals other than maximizing profit.
While these cases frequently appear in discussions of the proper
goals of a corporation, it is quite interesting to note that they both
occur in the context of a controlling shareholder whose name
appears either in the corporation's name or on the location that is
the source of the dispute. In the Ford opinion, there is language
indicating that the court feared Ford's proposed expenditures were
too closely tied to his personal reputation as a progressive em-
ployer.12 v It seems that decisions diverging from profit maximization
may be particularly likely in such circumstances. Wealthy control
persons like Ford and Wrigley see their companies as extensions of
themselves. While they obviously care about money, they care about
other values as well and are willing to use their corporations to
advance those other values even (sometimes) at the cost of lowered
profits.
2. The Law of the Closely Held Mark
In a situation such as the Steve's/Herrell's ice cream store
scenario, 2 ' the departure of a founding entrepreneur to found a new
firm in the same line of business as his previous firm holds the
potential of pitting personal goodwill and reputation of the entrepre-
neur against the business goodwill and reputation conveyed with
the sale of the earlier business. Customers associate a certain
126. John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Shareholder Rights and Legislative Wrongs:
Toward Balanced Takeover Legislation, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1425, 1449-50 (1991).
127. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 683-84.
128. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
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reputation and degree of goodwill with the initial firm, but this may
be difficult to disentangle from the founder's personal reputation.
129
To the extent that the initial firm relies upon the personal reputa-
tion of the founder, and to the extent that customers are aware of
the founder's presence at the new firm, that goodwill will follow the
founder and may be transferred to the new firm. This leaves the
question as to whether any goodwill separate from the founder's
personal reputation was conveyed with the sale of the initial firm,
and if so, whether the founder can avoid carrying the initial firm's
business goodwill to the new firm.
Presumably, we would want innovative entrepreneurs to apply
their talents to founding new businesses in a competitive market;
we generally hold that the public is better off with a choice of ice
cream shops rather than a monopoly by one chain. The personal
reputation of the founder of the initial business as a successful
entrepreneur and innovator may be critical to attract capital to
establish new ventures. If the founder's personal reputation is
locked too tightly to her first established business, the only outlet
for the founder's new ideas will be within the structure of the
existing firm. This results in either the suppression of such initia-
tives or in the inefficient growth of the firm from the addition of new
divisions and subsidiaries that optimally should have been new
ventures entirely. Indeed, entrepreneurs may be wary of situations
where their reputations may become firm assets if they know they
may be hampered from embarking on future ventures. Such a rule
might hamper development of entrepreneurial ventures in the first
place.
But neither would we want a rule in which the founder of the firm
was able to walk away at any time with the eponymous mark, which
may be an asset that is critical to the firm's operations. Such a rule
would allow the founder to engage in hold-up of the firm, even after
having assigned the asset to the firm, threatening the firm's very
existence. Similarly, in the other examples we have sketched, we
would expect to draw some distinction between the actions of the
firm and the actions of the eponymous founder of the firm in order
to preserve the value of the asset to each of them. This militates in
favor of a "goldilocks" median for trademarks; too much control over
129. See Ramello & Silva, supra note 7, at 946.
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the closely held mark detrimentally motivates investment by the
employee, whereas too little control detrimentally motivates
investment by the firm.
Trademark law is consistent with this analysis in several
respects. First, trademark law has long forbidden licensing of
trademarks "in gross," a term that refers to licensing of the trade-
mark alone, without the associated business reputation or goodwill
triggered by the mark.3 ° Trademark licenses must transfer rights
in the mark alongside business reputation or goodwill.131 The rule
confirms that the critical asset transferred by a trademark license
is not merely the signal, but the reputation signaled. Thus, to retain
trademark protection, a personal name cannot be transferred unless
accompanied by business reputation; where one goes the other goes.
Black letter trademark doctrines also reflect the goldilocks
approach that we have suggested would best minimize transaction
costs. Courts have long held that where a personal name has
become a mark and has been sold with a business, the named
individual has a heightened duty to avoid subsequent confusion
through disclaimers or other notices if she continues in the same or
similar line of business.'32 At the same time, courts have shown
considerable reluctance to curtail an individual from using her own
name in pursuing a livelihood."13 Thus, cases hold that an employee
with personal reputation in a line of business can still truthfully use
his personal name as a name, for example, to advertise that he is
now associated with a competitor to his former eponymous firm.'34
Trademark cases also distinguish "closely held mark" situations
from inadvertent eponymy. Courts have been somewhat reluctant
to issue an injunction against a good faith junior user who happens
to have the same personal name that another business uses for a
trademark. 3 ' This is not the case where the bearer of the personal
name has sold the name with an eponymous business and then
130. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, §§ 18:1, 18:2.
131. Id.
132. See Goldwyn Pictures Corp. v. Goldwyn, 296 F. 391, 400 (2d Cir. 1924); Ralph Bros.
Furniture Co. v. Ralph, 338 Pa. 360, 363 (Penn. 1940); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 13:10; 3
MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 18:33.
133. See Sardie's Rest. v. Sardie, 755 F.2d 719, 725 (9th Cir. 1985); Abraham Zion Corp.
v. Lebow, 593 F. Supp. 551, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, §§ 13:8, 13:9.
134. See Madrigal Audio Labs., Inc. v. Cello, Ltd., 799 F.2d 814, 823 (2d Cir. 1986).
135. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 13:9.
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wishes to use the name again in a new competing business; in-
junctions issue more freely in such situations.13 Conversely, some
courts have suggested that it constitutes a type of fraud for the
purchaser of a personal name mark to represent that the bearer of
the name is still affiliated with the business, especially in cases
when the abilities or qualifications of the individual would be
important to consumers. 37
Similar rules apply when personal names are involved in the
dissolution or bankruptcy of a firm. In cases where a personal name
is used in a business, a name that denotes personal reputation is
not considered an asset that can be transferred involuntarily in
bankruptcy. 3 ' Typically, there must be some showing that the name
has become a mark and that it functions as an indicator of source
before it is considered a firm asset that can be acquired in bank-
ruptcy.139 In some cases where a personal name mark is acquired as
part of a business, a disclaimer must be used, indicating that the
named individual is no longer associated with the business in order
to avoid confusion. 14
0
In each of these situations, trademark law employs the require-
ment of secondary meaning to separate out the reputation of the
firm. Federal registration will be denied to marks that are "primar-
ily ... a surname. ' Personal names are not considered inherently
distinctive and must accrue secondary meaning through use before
they can be considered trademarks.'42 The key consideration is
whether the public perceives the word to constitute a personal name
or a designator of source. A personal name having gained secondary
meaning associated with the firm is now associated with the source
of goods and services rather than only with the person carrying the
name. Trademark law attaches only when marks such as "Ford,"
'Marriott," and "Disney," that may once have designated a business
136. See, e.g., Osgood Heating & Air Conditioning v. Osgood, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1432,
1434, 1437 (W.D. Tex. 2004).
137. See Madrigal Audio Labs., 799 F.2d at 825 n.5; Lyon v. Lyon, 246 Cal. App. 2d 519,
528,54 Cal. Rptr. 829, 834 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966); Gracey v. Maddin, 769 S.W.2d 497 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1989).
138. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 18:31.
139. Id.
140. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
141. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(4) (2006); see also 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 13:29.
142. 2 McCARTHY, supra note 7, § 13:2.
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owner or proprietor, become marks associated with automobiles,
hotels, and entertainment rather than with their originators'
personal names.
The legal form of firm governance may be important to the
allocation of closely held marks. For example, the problem of sepa-
rating personal and business reputation arises with some frequency
in entertainment, where the trademark of a musical group is closely
associated with one or two founding musicians and where groups
may break up or change membership with considerable frequency.'43
In determining assignment of musical group marks, an important
factor appears to be the form of business association chosen to hold
the mark. In cases of partnership, courts appear more likely to
attribute goodwill in the name to personal goodwill and will allow
departing members to continue using the name of their former
group.144 When a corporate form is chosen for the group's business
transactions, courts appear more likely to hold that trademark
rights vest and remain in the corporation.14
McCarthy argues that questions of multiple trademark ownership
cannot be solved by simple reference to rules of corporate and
partnership law, but rather require a focus on trademark policies
regarding source and quality. 4 ' While not disagreeing with this
observation, we note that the division between personal goodwill
and source goodwill may lend itself to one business form or another.
We can at least see a few possible justifications for the distinction
between partnership and corporate forms in these cases. Different
choices of organizational form may suggest different intentions of
the group members at the time of formation. Corporations may be
understood to have a more formal and distinctly separate existence
from their shareholders and employees than partnerships have from
their partners. That may signify a desire for the band to have an
existence distinct from that of any of its individual members.
This understanding of the difference between partnerships and
corporations reflects real legal differences. Indeed, under the old
143. See id. § 16:45.
144. See Fuqua v. Watson, 107 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 251, 251-52 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955).
145. See, e.g., Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318 F.3d 900, 909 (9th Cir. 2003); Five
Platters, Inc. v. Purdie, 419 F. Supp. 372, 383 (D. Md. 1976); Rare Earth, Inc. v. Hoorelbeke,
401 F. Supp. 26, 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
146. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 16:45, at 16-91.
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Uniform Partnership Act, partnerships were not conceived of as
legal entities distinct from their partners, although this is no longer
true under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act. 147 Even under the
newer law, though, partners retain the ability to withdraw from the
business and take their share of the business's assets with them, 1
48
which is not possible in a corporation.
B. Employee Goodwill
The examples discussed so far contemplate corporate reputation
that is intertwined with that of founders or celebrity employees of
the firm. However, these effects are not limited to the closely held
trademark, where the reputation of a prominent, typically founding
employee must be differentiated from that of the firm. This type of
intertwined employee and firm reputation is relatively common for
smaller businesses or sole proprietorships. It is less common for
large firms, when the majority of employees may be publicly anon-
ymous. Intertwined reputation, however, may become an issue with
regard to rank and file employees such as sales personnel who
routinely represent or act on behalf of the firm. Such situations can
arise where the employee's personal name is not the name of the
firm, but the employee's face and behavior are, at least in limited
situations, the public face and behavior of the firm.
These possibilities, to some extent, parallel certain situations
identified by Lester and Talley in trade secrecy, where an asset such
as a customer list is the result of joint effort by the employee and
the firm. Customers may be attracted and retained by the personal-
ity and behavior of the sales personnel, as well as by the quality of
goods, prompt delivery, and other services provided by the firm.'49
147. REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 201 & cmts. (1997), 6 U.L.A. 91 (2001).
148. See id. § 601 & cmts. (discussing partnership dissociation). Under the old Uniform
Partnership Act, when a partner wrongfully left a partnership and the remaining partners
continued the business, the departing partner got her share of the value of the partnership
less any damage caused. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 38(1) (1914), 6 U.L.A. 487 (2001).
Interestingly for our analysis here, in calculating the value of the business, the value of the
business's goodwill was excluded. See id. § 38(c)(II). That is not true in the Revised Act.
REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 602(c).
149. Gillian L.L. Lester & Eric L. Talley, Trade Secrets and Mutual Investments 1-2
(U.S.C.L. Sch., Olin Research Paper No. 00-15; Geo. L. & Econ., Research Paper No. 246406,
2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=246406.
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Allocating such a resource when the employee parts ways with the
firm treads the line between, on the one hand, depriving the firm of
an asset in which it has invested, and on the other hand, depriving
the employee of an important resource for personal income develop-
ment. 5 ° Either error invites one of the parties to underinvest in the
resource.
As in the case of the closely held mark, trademark law may serve
to partition the reputational investment of the firm from that of the
rank and file employee. It does not, of course, operate in isolation.
Trade secrecy or agency law might keep a departing employee from
appropriating the employer's customer lists, and contractual non-
competition agreements might geographically or sectorally separate
an ex-employee from the former employer. Many employers will
impose such employee noncompete agreements to prevent former
employees from working in the same geographic area, business
sector, or product line for a period of time after separation from the
firm. But noncompete agreements, like all contracts, are incomplete,
and trademark law defaults may play a significant role in separat-
ing the reputational capital of the employee from that of the firm in
situations when both are investing in relational assets.
We expect that such employee reputational situations are most
likely to arise in service or sales, for example, when the personal
relationships developed by a sales representative become an im-
portant factor in the firm's business in a geographic or marketing
sector. Customers may be choosing to deal with a firm based on the
quality and reputation of the product branded by the firm; but they
may also be choosing to deal with the firm because of the personal-
ity, the personal reputation, and even the personal promises or
assurances of the firm's representative. 5' It may be difficult to
partition the results of these factors when the employee and the
firm part ways.
The relative importance of firm representatives' reputation and
firm brand reputation will likely vary depending upon the goods and
services purveyed. The sale of branded and recognized products by
a firm representative presents a very different situation than that
of a representative selling unbranded staple articles of commerce.
150. Id. at 2.
151. See Ramello & Silva, supra note 7, at 947.
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A purchaser looking for information about the product might rely on
personal reputation, on firm reputation, or on some combination.
We would anticipate, for example, that a sales representative's
reputation would be most important in the case of unbranded
products-say, a fungible product such as grain-when the lack of
a mark leaves a buyer with little information about the origin or
quality of the good, and so pushes the customer toward increased
reliance on the personal reputation of the purveyor of the goods.
As the signal conveyed by the mark on the goods becomes
stronger, the purchaser will tend to care less about the reputation
of the firm representative. The needed information is derived from
the associations connected with the mark and because the employ-
ees in such cases become more fungible, any sales representative
will do. Indeed, the two reputation sets stand in something of an
inverse, reciprocal relationship; the stronger the branded reputation
of the product, the less important the reputation of the employee,
but the weaker the branded reputation of the product, the more
important the reputation of the employee. This phenomenon may
contribute to the demise of local "mom and pop" businesses as
nationally branded businesses move into an area.
The importance of this trademark effect will also depend upon
the goods and services in question. Economists divide goods into
categories based upon the information that a buyer can derive from
interaction with the goods. 5 ' The quality of some goods, called
"inspection" goods, can be readily ascertained by direct experience
of sight, touch, or smell before purchase, such as fruit purchased
from an open stand.'53 The quality of other goods cannot be immedi-
ately ascertained, but must be experienced over time after purchase,
such as the reliability of an automobile ignition.' Such experience
goods require the purchaser to place a degree of trust in the vendor
because the quality of the goods will only be fully known after
purchase. 5 Even if some recourse is available, such as a warranty
or guarantees against defects found after purchase, the seller must
152. WILLIAM A. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW
284 (1987) [hereinafter LANDES & POSNER, TORT LAW].
153. Id.
154. Id.; see also Nelson, supra note 1, at 311-12.
155. See Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of
Fraud, 16 J.L. & ECON. 67, 68-69 (1973).
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be made to honor the guarantee. Finally, some goods, such as legal
or medical services, may never be fully understood or assessed by
the purchaser and therefore are known as "credence" goods because
consumers must fully rely on the representations of the expert seller
to know the quality of what they are purchasing.
156
Trust mechanisms are likely to be more important for categories
of goods that the consumer cannot personally evaluate; the con-
sumer is more vulnerable to fraud or deception in the cases of
experience or credence goods. Reputation or a personal relationship
with a vendor might induce the consumer to trust the representa-
tions made regarding the quality of credence goods. Alternatively,
trademarks that convey the reputation of the firm might induce
consumers to rely upon the representations regarding these goods.
Thus trademarks in general are expected to be most useful and
important in the case of experience or credence goods, especially the
latter.157
Trademarks are also most likely to serve as a substitute for
personal reputation in the purchase of these goods. Trademarks
may therefore diminish the value of a given employee to the firm as
the trademark replaces some of the information that would
otherwise be conveyed to customers by personal information. The
corollary is that a given employee is less likely to be able to engage
in costly hold-up of the firm because the firm is less reliant on the
personal reputation developed by a given employee. Additionally, to
the extent that a given employee becomes largely fungible and
easily replaceable, trademarks will tend to encourage such replace-
ment if an employee attempts to extract additional surplus from
her employment agreement. Employees who know that they are
replaceable will be less likely to impose either type of cost on the
firm. This will tend to lower the internal transaction costs of firms,
creating an incentive for firms to grow and rely less often on the
market.
At some point, however, there may be offsetting costs to this
trend; the diminution of employees' personal capital may lead to less
interesting and satisfactory work environments and less investment
156. LANDES & POSNER, TORT LAW, supra note 152, at 284-85; Darby & Karni, supra note
155, at 68-69.
157. See Tom W. Bell, Virtual Trade Dress: A Very Real Problem, 56 MD. L. REV. 384, 406-
0 (1997).
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in interpersonal skills and reputation that otherwise might be
portable to future employment. The inability to attract employees
could cause such firms to remain smaller than is optimal. The
"goldilocks" principle again predicts an optimum degree of trade-
mark protection that prevents an employee from using personal
reputation to hold up the firm, while still allowing the firm to
attract desirable employees.
III. INTER-FIRM EFFECTS
We have suggested several ways in which the presence of
trademark rights may lower the internal transaction costs of firms,
primarily in dealings with their own employees. But the theory of
the firm predicts that the boundary of the firm will be drawn based
upon the differential between internal and external transaction
costs-the differential will determine whether firms negotiate
production contracts with other firms in the market or produce
those factors within the hierarchy of the firm. Firms will vertically
integrate or disintegrate depending on which option yields the
lowest transaction cost structure. Trademarks and related regimes
may affect not only the internal allocation of transaction costs, but
also the cost between firms in the market by preventing "hold-ups"
and allocating residual rights when contracts are incomplete." 8
A. Bargaining Defaults
Property-based theories of the firm hold that property rights
lower transaction costs when the parties to a bargain may defect
by misappropriating tangible or intellectual assets. Trademark
ownership prevents a somewhat different kind of defection by a
contracting party, such as using substandard methods or materi-
als--capitalizing on the reputation built up by the trademark owner
without making a concomitant investment in maintaining the
reputation. Should a license fail to provide for some instance of
such defection, so that a licensee is able to act opportunistically, the
trademark may constitute residual rights in the owner's reputation,
preventing misappropriation of reputational assets.
158. See Ramello & Silva, supra note 7, at 945.
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The most striking inter-firm instance of this effect may arise in
the case of certification marks, which are used to indicate that
goods meet a particular set of standards specified by a group of
producers. 159 In this case, the "source" of the marked goods is not a
particular firm, but rather a collection of firms that have agreed
upon, and conform to, a particular set of product specifications. The
mark acts as a coordinating feature, ensuring that no given pro-
ducer shirks on the specification, much as industry standards
function to ensure compliance with specifications. 60 Absent the
mechanism of product compliance marking, it might be necessary to
integrate such firms into a single firm. Instead, manufacture of
comparable goods is facilitated by the mark into a production
structure that is almost fully "dis-integrated" into independent
producers.
As in the case of certification marks, or of more conventional
bilateral trademark licensing, we might primarily expect to see
trademark law lowering transaction costs by specifying the proper
placement of a mark on goods and services-either keeping the
mark off of goods that do not originate with the source or requiring
the mark to appear on goods that do originate from the source.
Surprisingly, legal rules authorizing the omission of a trademark
from products may be important to facilitate outsourcing of
production and firm differentiation. This is apparent in the recent
Seventh Circuit decision in Bretford Manufacturing Inc. v. Smith
System Manufacturing Corp.6' The defendants in the case devel-
oped a prototype display of office furniture cobbled together from
parts that included pieces from a competitor's products.'62 The
plaintiff competitor alleged that the display of the prototype to
potential buyers constituted "reverse passing off,"' 3 that is, that the
defendant had passed the plaintiffs products off as its own-in this
case by not affixing the plaintiffs mark to the furniture parts.'64
159. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
160. See Hendrik Hakenes & Martin Peitz, Umbrella Branding and External Certification,
53 EuRo. ECON. REv. 186 (2009).
161. 419 F.3d 576 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Roho, Inc. v. Marquis, 902 F.2d 356,360 (5th Cir.
1990).
162. Bretford, 419 F.3d at 578.
163. Id.
164. In the standard trademark scenario, the defendant infringer passes its own goods off
as those of the plaintiff trademark owner, but a reverse infringer passes off another's goods
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Trademark law certainly allows multiple marks to appear on a
product, including marks indicating the source of components or
ingredients.'65 But as a general rule, components of industrial pro-
ducts are not marked as to their source, and a rule requiring such
marking would be burdensome, possibly prohibitive to the assem-
bly of component products. Industrial products typically entail
myriad components from myriad sources, and consumers generally
neither know, nor care to know, the source of those components. The
Bretford opinion by Judge Easterbrook noted, for example, that
automobile components very seldom have any visible source mark-
ings, with rare exceptions such as those on tires and perhaps on the
radio or other entertainment systems. 6' The marked components
are, significantly, most frequently the components over which con-
sumers have some choice, allowing them to upgrade the car stereo
or tires from the standard options.
Easterbrook's opinion, in other words, attempts to forestall the
development of a trademark licensing anticommons, where the
manufacturers of office furniture, consumer electronics, automo-
biles, and countless other multicomponent industrial products
would be required to label every component of their assembled
products in order to avoid the legal implication that they were
attempting to pass individual components off as their own products.
The burden of avoiding reverse passing off, let alone the cost of
physically labeling every nut, bolt, capacitor, and cable would likely
prompt massive integration. Manufacturers could avoid the "reverse
passing off" claim by moving component production in-house, so
that a single label for the assembled product would suffice. Reliev-
ing manufacturers of liability for reverse passing off of components
facilitates outsourcing of component manufacture, permitting con-
tractual disaggregation of component production.
In certain instances, multicomponent products may conspicuously
indicate the brand or source of certain components, for example,
branded kitchenware touting 'Teflon" coatings or computer laptops
displaying brand stickers for "Intel Inside" or "NVIDIA" graphics
cards. Although at one time separate marks on the same products
as his own. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 25:6.
165. See Saul Lefkowitz, Double Trademarking-We've Come a Long Way, 73 TRADEMARK
REP. 11, 20 (1983).
166. Bretford, 419 F.3d at 580.
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raised questions of source, trademark law has developed to allow
such marking so long as the component mark indicates a separate
source and the holder of the mark retains control over the quality
and use of the independently designated component. 167 In some
cases, such control may counsel monitoring or oversight of the
quality of the final product incorporating the separately marked
component or ingredient. This in turn militates in favor of licensing
the component mark, along with the component, under a quality
control agreement.
168
Such departures from the general norm of component anonymity
are likely to have been specially negotiated, presumably in those
cases in which identification of the components has some value to
consumers at least sufficient to make the additional effort worth-
while to the manufacturer. The holding of the Bretford case sets a
default rule that product components need not be marked, a default
that can be varied by contract if there is sufficient surplus in the
deal to overcome the transaction costs of such negotiating."9 For
comparison, we could imagine the alternative Coasean counter-
factual where component marking is required, and the assembling
manufacturer is permitted to contractually opt out of marking.
Bargaining analysis running back to Coase's classic article The
Problem of Social Cost argues that in the absence of transaction
costs, the right to demand component marking, or the right to
eschew marking, could equally well be assigned to the relevant
party in the transaction, leaving the other party to negotiate
departure from the default.' v Of course, transaction costs will exist
for such bargaining, meaning that the sensible default would be the
one that minimizes negotiation costs relative to the value generated
by negotiated departures from the default. Easterbrook's Bretford
reasoning essentially designates not marking components as the
most likely low-cost default, from which there will be occasional
situations valuable enough to negotiate a component marking
agreement. 171
167. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 7:8.
168. See Lefkowitz, supra note 165, at 24.
169. Bretford, 419 F.3d at 580-81.
170. R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
171. Bretford, 419 F.3d at 580-81.
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The bargaining surplus that might prompt a marking agreement
ultimately derives from the consumer; variations from the default
will most likely be negotiated where there is some value to the
consumer from them. We expect that component marking is likely
most valuable to consumers in the case of credence goods, such as
"Intel Inside" computers, where the average consumer is unlikely to
disassemble a computer to check for a preferred brand of micropro-
cessor chip and would be unlikely to recognize one microprocessor
from another even if he were to "check under the hood." In such
cases, the additional component marking supplies branding
information that may be relevant to assessing the quality and
desirability of hidden features.
The Bretford decision implicated the question as to what iteration
of an item in modern industrial production is a "product" that
should properly be marked as to source. Consumers may recognize
a given brand of automobile, Ford or Toyota or BMW, as deriving
from a particular source, but typically that source has assembled
parts from other sources that are unknown to consumers. One point
in the chain of production is indicated as the repository and
beneficiary of product reputation.
Reverse passing off requires a false designation of origin, and
Bretford essentially holds that the "origin" of a multicomponent
product in commerce is the assembler.172 This, in turn, implies an
assumption that an organic "product" comes into being at a
particular point in the vertical supply chain. This question in some
ways parallels the familiar antitrust problem of "tying" products
together, requiring purchase of one product in order to buy
another.'73 Under some circumstances, tying may be an antitrust
violation, but in general the law does not question the existence of
a unified "product" even if it comprises components that could be
disaggregated.'74 It is generally an unexceptional requirement that
a consumer buy the left shoe in order to buy the right shoe, or the
carburetor in order to get the chassis, or the operating system in
order to get the compiler.
172. Id. at 581.
173. 9 PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HovENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 1700a (2d ed. 2004).
174. See 10 PHILIP E. AREEDA, EINER ELHAUGE & HERBERT HOvENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
1740, at 150-51 (2d ed. 2004).
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Other trademark doctrines might also be viewed as intended to
minimize the type of transaction cost anticommons effect that we
have identified in our earlier work. For example, courts have tended
to treat the business goodwill that is symbolized by a mark as an
indivisible asset."'5 One prominent commentator has noted that the
division of goodwill is, in effect, a version of trademark assignment
"in gross," that is, of separately assigning the mark from the
reputation it indicates."'6 Divided uses of marks could lead to a type
of reputational anticommons where competing holders of partial
rights engage in fragmented and competing uses, resulting in
consumer confusion. Treating the mark as indivisible effectuates
the general policy of having a single legal entity controlling the
mark in order to vindicate the public interest in identifying source
and prevent consumer confusion from fragmented or conflicting
uses of the mark.
For similar reasons, the United States Patent and Trademark
Office, although recognizing that a joint venture may be a separate
single legal entity that can hold a trademark, has been wary of
trademark registrations by joint owners."' Uses of a mark by a
controlled subsidiary corporation inure to the benefit of the parent
corporation,178 and generally only one company, the parent, can
register the mark federally as its owner. Upon dissolution of a joint
venture, some courts have prevented either party from using a mark
owned by the venture even if the venture agreement provided for
both parties to use the mark upon dissolution."'9
The rule regarding reputational unity is not limited to supply or
outsourcing, but also extends to chains of distribution. In general,
mere distributors or dealers of a marked product do not, simply by
handling goods, accrue rights in the trademark affixed by a manu-
facturer or producer."8 Unquestionably there are distributor marks
175. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 16:40.
176. Id. § 16:44.
177. Patricia Kimball Fletcher, Comment, Joint Registration of Trademarks and the
Economic Value of a Trademark System, 36 U. MIAMI L. REv. 297, 299 (1982).
178. 2 McCARTHY, supra note 7, at § 16:37; see also K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S.
281, 283 (1988) ("[The] parent corporation-not the ... subsidiary whose every decision it
controls- ... better fits the bill as the true owner of any property that the subsidiary
nominally possesses.").
179. See, e.g., Durango Herald, Inc. v. Riddle, 719 F. Supp. 941, 951-52 (D. Colo. 1988).
180. 4 McCARTHY, supra note 7, § 25:31 (noting that use of mark by licensee builds up no
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that embody the reputation and goodwill of the distributor, and a
distributor may be entitled to a separate mark indicating the
distribution source. But accrual of distribution goodwill does not
entitle the distributor to use the product mark. And, as the Bretford
decision suggests, it is doubtful that the last link in a distribution
chain need accommodate multiple marks absent some agreement to
the contrary.'
B. Franchise Structure
Our discussion of trademarks and firm structure would not be
complete without some discussion of franchising, which is perhaps
the most apparent and notable example of the effect of trademarks
on business organization. Previous commentators have noted sev-
eral implications of the franchise structure under the theory of the
firm.1"2 Much of this literature focuses on the antitrust implications
of franchise agreements, which frequently include procurement or
tying arrangements that have in the past posed challenges to
competition law.' We do not propose to recapitulate this previous
work, but we note that surprisingly little of this analysis has di-
rectly addressed the role of trademarks or trademark law. The
influences at work in franchising are diverse, but trademarks have
been called the key or central feature of franchising systems."s
Thus, in this final section we propose to highlight several observa-
tions regarding the particular influence of trademarks on franchis-
ing structures.
The centrality of the franchise trademark is reflected in both
law and economics. Looking first at legal doctrine, there are many
legal definitions of the term "franchise," but the leading national
rights in trademark as against licensor).
181. Bretford Mfg. Inc. v. Smith Sys. Mfg. Corp., 419 F.3d 576, 581 (7th Cir. 2005).
182. See, e.g., Alan J. Meese, Antitrust Balancing in a (Near) Coasean World: The Case of
Franchise Tying Contracts, 95 MICH. L. REV. 111, 113 (1996) [hereinafter Meese, Antitrust
Balancing]; Alan J. Meese, Monopolization, Exclusion, and the Theory of the Firm, 89 MINN.
L. REV. 743 (2005); Paul H. Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise
Contract, 21 J.L. & ECON. 223 (1978); D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of
Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1478 (2002).
183. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein & Lester F. Salt, The Law & Economics of Franchise Tying
Contracts, 28 J.L. & ECON. 345 (1985); Meese, Antitrust Balancing, supra note 182.
184. See, e.g., David Gurnick, Intellectual Property in Franchising: A Survey of Today's
Domestic Issues, 20 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 347, 347 (1995).
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definition may well be that of the Federal Trade Commission's
franchise rule. That definition has three elements, the first of which
states: 'The franchisee will obtain the right to operate a business
that is identified or associated with the franchisor's trademark, or
to offer, sell, or distribute goods, services, or commodities that are
identified or associated with the franchisor's trademark.' 85
Thus, the trademark is situated at the heart of the legal defini-
tion of franchising. Moreover, the second element of the definition
focuses on the fact that "[t]he franchisor will exert or has authority
to exert a significant degree of control over the franchisee's method
of operation.' 86 We shall see that this franchisor control focuses on
maintaining the value of the trademark.
As for the economics of franchising, we earlier noted Oliver Hart's
observation that a firm needs some sort of property to serve as its
"glue."'87 A trademarked product or business format is the glue at
the heart of a business franchise. 8 Commentators on the economics
of franchises have noted the value of standardization-a customer
contemplating a franchised product is assured a standardized level
of product quality anywhere in the nation, or perhaps even any-
where in the world.'89 This is not to say that the franchise product
is necessarily of better quality than that of an independent pro-
ducer, but the franchised product is a known quantity. 90 The signal
for consumer recognition of the standard is the trademark; the
signaling of source and known quality is the common theme of
trademark law and of franchising.'9 '
In our previous work on intellectual property and the theory of
the firm, we focused on how intellectual property affects the optimal
boundaries of firms, assuming that the boundary of the firm,
although variable, was relatively sharp.'92 Certainly the relevant
laws governing franchise relationships, including trademark law,
contract law, specialized laws aimed at franchises, and a variety
185. 16 C.F.R. § 436.1(h)(1) (2008).
186. Id. § 436.1(h)(2).
187. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
188. See Giovanni Ramello, What's in a Sign? Trademark Law and Economic Theory, 20
ECON. SURvEYs 547, 553 (2006).
189. See Klein & Saft, supra note 183, at 349.
190. Id.
191. See id. at 349-50.
192. Burk & McDonnell, Patents, supra note 5, at 991.
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of other kinds of laws, will affect how the firm's boundaries are
drawn.'93 But franchises present an unusual profile with regard to
the theory of the firm, lying neither wholly within nor wholly
outside a firm structure."" The franchisee controls many functions
of the franchise, such as hiring, day to day operations management,
financing, and location.'95 The franchisor typically dictates other
functions, such as marketing, procurement, and decor. 9 '
This combination of independence and oversight presents a puzzle
as to why the business should not be either wholly owned by the
franchisor or wholly independently owned by the local entrepreneur.
If internalizing operations to secure oversight and control of the
business assets is important to the franchisor, one might expect the
franchised stores to be wholly owned by the franchisor.'97 If maxi-
mum flexibility for innovation in operations is important, one might
expect the franchised store to be wholly independent.'98 Franchises
seem to have one foot in the firm and one foot out of the firm.
The hybrid franchise structure may be best explained by consid-
ering that certain business functions may have lower transaction
costs if internalized; other functions may have lower transaction
costs if divorced from the firm.'99 For example, advertising may best
be developed and coordinated centrally, on a national basis, rather
than by fragmented and possibly conflicting advertising campaigns
conducted at the local level.200 National advertising may not be
tailored to local markets, but given the nature of mass media,
centralized advertising offers benefits from economies of scale and
promotes uniformity.2 ' On the other hand, hiring may best be done
193. Thomas M. Pitegoff, Franchise Relationship Laws: A Minefield for Franchisors, in
BUILDING FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIPS 140,144 (Ann Hurwitz & Rochelle Buchsbaum Spandorf
eds., 1996).
194. See Rubin, supra note 182, at 225.
195. Rupert M. Barkoff & Andrew C. Seldon, Introduction to FUNDAMENTALS OF
FRANCHISING, at xvii, xvii-xviii (Rubert M. Barkoff & Andrew C. Seldon eds., 3d ed. 2008).
196. Id.
197. See Richard E. Caves & William F. Murphy II, Franchising: Firms, Markets, and
Intangible Assets, 42 S. ECON. J. 572, 584 (1976).
198. Id.
199. See Rubin, supra note 182, at 231.
200. Id.
201. Stigler, supra note 1, at 213, 220-24 (analyzing the economics of advertising).
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locally by an entrepreneur who knows the local labor market, rather
than being centralized." 2
Consideration of franchising forces one to realize that the bound-
aries of the firm can be porous. Franchise organizational structures
have a hybrid form, in some ways looking like one firm and in
others like a network of firms contracting with each other.20 3 Indeed,
franchises themselves display a range of increments of ownership
and control; some franchise agreements specify franchisor over-
sight for nearly every business function, while others leave exten-
sive latitude to the franchisee.2 4 This suggests that as a general
matter the "make or buy" decision is not in fact binary, but rather
takes different forms along a continuum from fully integrating a
production function within the firm to fully arm's length negotia-
tions for production.2 5
Even within a given franchise system, the choice of business
arrangement is not either/or, to franchise or to own. Most franchise
systems will have some company-owned establishments.2 6 Which
establishments are company-owned depends presumably on a dif-
fering balance of incentives for the employee versus the franchisee
relationship.2 7 For instance, some commentators have related that
Standard Oil was willing to franchise its fuel station operations to
owners not located on the major interstate highways, but the
company always directly owned fuel stations located on the inter-
states.208
The explanation for this differential policy has to do with free
riding and repeat business. Motorists passing through on the
interstates were likely transient, one time customers whom the
business would never see again.20 ' In that situation, there existed
202. Rubin, supra note 182, at 231.
203. See Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability Unlimited, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 407, 414
(1999).
204. Id.
205. Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Contract Clauses and the Franchisor's Duty of Care
Toward its Franchisees, 72 N.C. L. REV. 905, 921-22 (1994).
206. Caves & Murphy, supra note 197, at 581.
207. Id. at 584.
208. See Meese, Antitrust Balancing, supra note 182, at 119-20; Keith K Wollenberg, Note,
An Economic Analysis of Tie-in Sales: Re-examining the Leverage Theory, 39 STAN. L. REV.
737, 754-55 & n.114 (1987). Other commentators have noted similar strategies by other
franchisors. See Klein & Saft, supra note 183, at 348 n.15, 350.
209. Meese, Antitrust Balancing, supra note 182, at 119.
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an incentive for an independent business owner to skimp on pro-
ducts or services, as he would likely never see a dissatisfied cus-
tomer again.21 ° Standard's national reputation would be damaged
by such local diminution of quality; an independent interstate
operator could essentially free ride on Standard's national reputa-
tion.211 Consequently, Standard exercised direct ownership over
those businesses in order to prevent such opportunism.2 2
Off of the interstate, however, filling stations were likely to see
customers from the local area rather than transient customers
passing by on their way elsewhere.2" 3 The probability of localized
patronage militated against a filling station skimping on services,
as such activity would be penalized through the development of a
poor local reputation and the loss of repeat local business."4 Less
oversight was necessary for such stations; they did not need to be
brought under central control. Thus, Standard was able to allow
stations off the interstate to be independently owned because the
probability of repeat business served as a natural check on the
temptation to cheat.21 5
This anecdote illustrates how localized shirking can be avoided
by vertical integration, resulting in direct oversight of production
and quality control.216 However, integration may be undesirable
when local control has some comparative advantage over centraliza-
210. Klein & Saft, supra note 183, at 350; Meese, Antitrust Balancing, supra note 182, at
119.
211. Meese, Antitrust Balancing, supra note 182, at 119-20.
212. Id.
213. See Wollenberg, supra note 208, at 754 n.114.
214. See id.
215. Id.
216. Klein & Saft, supra note 183, at 350 & n.20; see also James A. Brickley & Frederick
H. Dark, The Choice of Organizational Form: The Case of Franchising, 18 J. FIN. ECON. 401
(1987) (discussing the factors that lead to direct ownership or franchising within the same
firm). It is worth noting that Brickley and Dark did not find empirical evidence of increased
direct ownership along interstate highways, perhaps because other organizational factors
offset the transient customer problem. See id. at 418-19. Some commentators have argued
that a combination of direct ownership and franchising also promotes other benefits. See, e.g.,
Frank A. Scott, Franchising vs. Company Ownership as a Decision Variable of the Firm, 10
REV. IND. ORG. 69 (1995) (arguing that mixed direct ownership and franchising secures firm
profit margins); Shira B. Lewin-Solomons, Innovation and Authority in Franchise Systems:
An Empirical Exploration of the Plural Form (Cambridge Working Papers in Econ., Paper No.
0015, 2000), available at http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/dae/repec/cam/pdf/wp0015.pdf (arguing
that mixed direct ownership and franchising serves to promote innovation).
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tion.217 It appears that franchises are more likely to use franchisee-
owned establishments in circumstances where local effort and
initiative are particularly important.218 Conversely, when franchisor
effort is particularly important and/or the temptations of franchisee
free riding on brand reputation are particularly high, franchisors
will be more prone to use company-owned establishments.219 Thus,
smaller units located further from headquarters are more likely to
be franchised. Similarly, companies with more valuable brands tend
to have lower levels of franchising.22 ° Franchising charts a middle
course between direct oversight and arm's length bargaining, but at
some elevated degree of risk to each party.
As the Standard Oil "highway problem" suggests, the particular
form of the franchise relationship will be structured with regard to
potential hold ups between franchisor and franchisee. Previous
commentators have emphasized that both franchisors and fran-
chisees face serious incentive problems within their relationship.22" '
For franchisors, the major issue is quality control.222 The franchise's
trademark is valuable, but if local franchisees let quality slip, the
product's or business's reputation will suffer.228 It is not the
franchisees, however, who will bear the full cost of the reduction in
reputation; this loss is imposed on everyone within the system.224
Hence franchisees will be tempted in a variety of ways to increase
their own short term profit by shirking on product or service quality
and effectively "free riding" off of the investment of the franchisor
and other franchisees in the system.225 If all franchisees do this, of
course, everyone in the system will lose as the value of the trade-
mark diminishes.226
217. Caves & Murphy, supra note 197, at 574-75.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 584.
220. ROGER D. BLAIR & FRANCINE LAFONTAINE, THE ECONOMICS OF FRANCHISING 114-15
(2005).
221. Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete
Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REv. 927, 949-50 (1990); Klein & Saft, supra note 183, 349-51.
222. Klein & Saft, supra note 183, at 349-51.
223. Hadfield, supra note 221, at 949-50.
224. Klein & Saft, supra note 183, at 349-50.
225. See James M. Treece, Trademark Licensing and Vertical Restrains in Franchising
Arrangements, 116 U. PENN. L. REv. 435, 465-66 (1968).
226. Hadfield, supra note 221, at 949-50.
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Franchisors, in turn, may face a temptation to defect at the
expense of franchisees. Franchisees invest large amounts of finan-
cial and human capital into the business. Much of this investment
is franchise specific: it is worthless or much less valuable outside of
the franchise business.227 This investment subjects franchisees to
opportunistic exploitation by franchisors.22 Franchisors may try to
terminate valuable franchises and convert them to company control,
or in a variety of more subtle ways they may try to force franchisees
to take actions that increase the overall mark's value to a small
degree, but at a high cost to franchisees.229
The central question is what law can, does, and should do to
address both of these kinds of opportunism. It is important to note
that many private contractual and market based mechanisms exist
to deal with these issues.23 ° Franchise agreements, for instance,
are quite lengthy and deal extensively with quality control. As for
franchisor opportunism, many argue that market mechanisms such
as reputation should prevent this.231 But there may be reasons why
such mechanisms work imperfectly. These mechanisms may pro-
vide room for the law to help police franchisor or franchisee oppor-
tunism."' Hadfield, for instance, argues that the contractual duty
of good faith should be used to help police franchisor opportunism.233
If courts go either too far or not far enough in providing such
protections, some franchises may respond in ways that move them
from the organizational structure we would observe at the optimal
level of legal rules. For instance, if Hadfield is right that the law
does not adequately protect franchisees from franchisor opportun-
ism, then we might observe less franchising than would be optimal,
as some potential franchisees choose not to get into a business
perceived to be exploitative, or as others withdraw.
227. On the importance of firm-specific investment, see Oliver E. Williamson, The Logic
of Economic Organization, in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM 90, 99-100 (Oliver E. Williamson &
Sidney G. Winter eds., 1991).
228. Hadfield, supra note 221, at 952-53.
229. See id. at 951-52.
230. See, e.g., Klein & Saft, supra note 183, at 345 (describing the use of tying for quality
control).
231. See, e.g., BLAIR & LAFONTAINE, supra note 220, at 271-75; Rubin, supra note 182, at
232.
232. Hadfield, supra note 221, at 992.
233. Id. at 984-90.
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Similarly, absent some protection from hold up, franchisors will
be more likely to vertically integrate, either buying local vendors
outright, or resorting to more restrictive forms of franchising than
would be optimal.234 Clearly, contract provides some degree of
assurance against franchisee free riding. But if.contracts are incom-
plete, trademark law provides a default when the franchise deal
goes sour: use of the trademark reverts to the trademark owner and
the franchisee is unable to continue free riding off the goodwill in
the mark." 5 Thus, previous commentators have noted that the need
to invest in physical instantiation of trademarks or trade dress can
create project specific assets that function as a type of bonding
mechanism.23 A franchise requirement that the franchisee invest
in specialized uniforms, packaging, d6cor, or architecture prevents
the franchisee from easily defecting from the licensing agreement
because he cannot repurpose such items without violating the
franchisor's trademark.
Optimally, the franchisee should also receive some legal assur-
ance that it will be able to repurpose its independently acquired
local reputational assets in a different venture if held up by the
franchisor. Some limitation to trademark rights is necessary to
keep franchisors from overreaching. Cases considering franchise
dissolution contemplate this problem, forbidding former franchisees
from continuing to use the previously licensed mark while also
holding that the franchisor has no interest in purely local reputation
and cannot, for example, prevent the former franchisee from
continuing to use the same method or style of business.237
Other aspects of trademark law also support the hybrid franchise
structure. For example, trademark law requires that trademark
owners police the use of the mark, not only externally for uses of
confusingly similar marks, but also internally with regard to quality
of goods or services associated with the mark.238 This means that a
trademark owner must exercise continuing oversight over licensees
234. Id. at 997-98.
235. Meese, Antitrust Balancing, supra note 182, at 136-37.
236. See Klein & Saft, supra note 183, at 346-47.
237. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 18:67.
238. Id. § 18:42.
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of the mark in order to prevent variations in associated goods or
services."' Failure to do so may result in loss of the mark.
This rule necessitates some oversight of trademark franchise
operations, at least with regard to the quality and uniformity of the
goods or services produced by the franchisee. But a large part of the
typical franchise agreement focuses on quality control.240 Contracts
often specify the products to be sold, hours of operation, operating
procedures, product standards, information systems to be used, and
similar matters.24' Franchise agreements may also specify many of
the inputs to be used in making the product or service.242 To ensure
that franchisees comply with these terms, franchisors must engage
in extensive inspection efforts.2 43 Trademark oversight is in fact the
explanation-or justification-for much of the franchisee oversight
in franchise agreements.
Trademark thus provides the legal justification for a range of
control over the franchise, running the gamut from franchises that
are nearly corporate subsidiaries to franchises that are effectively
independently owned outlets for the product. The trademark
provides residual rights against local defection, although some
commentators worry that trademark law may in fact provide the
franchisor with too much leverage.244 Thus, while franchising
presents an intermediate form when relationships are hard to
characterize as either inter- or intra-firm, the essence of a Coasean
approach to the firm still applies in explaining the franchise form
and how it responds to various legal rules.
CONCLUSION
We have now considered ways in which trademark law affects
intra-firm transactions, ways in which trademark law affects inter-
firm transactions, and ways in which trademark law affects
transactions that are hard to characterize as either inter- or intra-
firm in the hybrid organizational form of franchising. It has long
239. Id.
240. BLAIR & LAFONTAINE, supra note 220, at 125-32; Hadfield, supra note 221, at 940-44.
241. BLAIR & LAFONTAINE, supra note 220, at 126-27.
242. Id. at 131-32.
243. Id. at 134.
244. Hadfield, supra note 221, at 991-92.
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been understood that trademark law gives the owners of products
or services associated with a mark the incentive to make invest-
ments that increase the reputational value of those products or
services as the trademark right discourages free riding on that
reputation. However, these discussions have generally reserved the
question of what type of person or entity owns the trademark. We
can now see that at least sometimes this black box approach
obscures important questions. When a firm owns a trademark,
internal incentives will help determine how the mark's value is
developed. Moreover, the existence of trademark law and some of its
doctrinal details will help determine what transactions occur within
firms and what transactions occur between firms.
As we have emphasized in past work, intellectual property does
not operate in a vacuum, and is likely to be only one of a variety of
influences that shape the size and structure of firms. In some cases
it may not even be a major influence. This caveat will be as true of
trademarks as it is of other forms of intellectual property. In the
modern economy, however, the recognition and reputation associ-
ated with a trademark is frequently the most valuable asset
associated with a business. Consequently, we expect that in many
cases, trademarks will have a profound influence on the boundaries
of those firms. And in some cases, such as franchising industries,
trademarks and their associated costs may be critical in shaping the
structure of entire economic sectors.
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